Debates surrounding the issue of imperialism have been endlessly repeated from the early 20th century to the present. Many people think that imperialism is a relic of the past today, when colonies have disappeared. Some of them argue that the coercive domination of one state over another is itself an outdated practice that contradicts the dynamics of modern capitalism. Others understand imperialism simply as a government policy for the benefit of the military-industrial complex, or as military aggression for resource extortion.

However, these definitions capture only the phenomena and fail to explain the fundamental nature of the capitalist world system. In particular, if imperialism were simply a government policy separated from the system’s dynamics, it would be possible to eliminate imperialism through policy opposition or a change of government. On the other hand, if imperialism is a characteristic of the system that arises organically from the system itself, then the system itself must be eliminated in order to remove the threat of imperialism.

We must re-establish the concept of imperialism by viewing it as a systematic and inevitable attribute that appears at a specific stage of capitalist development. Imperialism is not simply a policy choice, but the very way global capitalism operates; it is the total expression of the dynamics in which capital and the state expand by using each other as mediums. In short, imperialism is the dynamic of global capitalism created when capital accumulation and inter-state competition meet.

I will first examine the discussions of Marxists and then seek to clarify the nature of imperialism today through the case of the US-China rivalry for hegemony.

Rosa Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital (1913): Capitalism Must Expand into Non-Capitalist Spheres to Survive

Rosa Luxemburg started from the premise that capitalism cannot realize (sell) all the produced surplus value within a system purely consisting of capitalists and workers. In her view, for capitalism not to collapse, it absolutely needs non-capitalist regions (colonies, rural areas, etc.) that have not yet been capitalized and this is precisely the cause of imperialism. Imperialism is the process by which capitalism expands by invading and annexing non-capitalist regions for its own survival. However, if the entire world becomes completely capitalized and there are no more non-capitalist spheres to absorb, capitalism will inevitably collapse economically.

Luxemburg’s such theory of imperialism has a flaw known as the underconsumption theory. This is because she viewed the lack of consumption (demand) within the capitalist system as the root cause of imperialist expansion. She argued that the mass consumption capacity within capitalism fails to keep pace with the development of productive forces and as a result, the realization of surplus value becomes impossible, creating a vacuum in demand, which is the driver of imperialism.

However, the goal of capitalist production is not consumption but accumulation. Surplus value does not necessarily have to be realized as consumer goods. Capitalists can use surplus value to buy new means of production (machinery and raw materials). In other words, surplus value can be realized as the market for “means of production to make means of production” (Department I) expands. The underconsumption theory mistakes the phenomenon (commodities not selling) for the cause. The reason commodities overflow in the market and do not sell is not so much because consumers lack money, but because capitalists have stopped investing. When the rate of profit falls, capitalists reduce investment and lay off workers. As a result, workers’ purchasing power drops and inventory piles up in the market. Therefore, the root cause of the crisis lies not in a lack of consumption, but in the fall in the rate of profit, which is the central engine of production. The underconsumption theory treats capitalism as if it were a system aimed at consumption. However, the most powerful booms in the history of capitalism occurred not when mass consumption increased, but when enterprises competitively made massive investments in new machinery. Consumption is merely a dependent variable to this accumulation process. Marx emphasized that the essence of capitalism lies in “production for production’s sake, accumulation for accumulation’s sake.” Imperialist (inter-imperialist) wars, too, do not occur because there are no markets to sell commodities, as Luxemburg thought, but rather occur in the process of capital mobilizing state power to compete globally in order to defend falling profit rates.

Bukharin’s Imperialism and World Economy (1917): The Dialectical Unity of the Internationalization and Nationalization of Capital

Nikolai Bukharin’s Imperialism and World Economy was published in 1917, the same year as Lenin’s Imperialism, but the writing itself was completed in 1915, a year before Lenin’s. Therefore, when tracing the genealogy of the theory, it is common to place Lenin after Bukharin. Furthermore, Lenin read Bukharin’s manuscript and fully supported it by writing a recommendation (preface) for it.

According to Bukharin, as capital accumulation intensifies, domestically the competition is restricted by the state; but internationally the national capital blocs engage in an arms race and this competition is resolved through war. Now, war has become not an accident but an inevitable product of inter-state competition. Official agreements and ‘peace’ that end conflicts or wars merely alternate as a breather for the next conflict or war.

It is very useful to take Bukharin’s analytical framework as the starting point of classical theory of imperialism. Bukharin explained the dynamics of imperialism as a dual tendency. First is the tendency toward the internationalization of capital. Capital transcends borders in search of profit, forming a global production network. Second is the tendency toward the nationalization (integration with the state) of capital. Internationalized capital becomes even more dependent on the protection and support from its own state and furthermore, tends to merge with the state machine to form a “state capitalist trust.” The “state capitalist trust” Bukharin spoke of means a new stage of capitalism in which the state and capital go beyond a simple cooperative relationship and are fused into a single organization. This is a core concept he proposed to explain the new phenomena of capitalism during World War I.

When the process of the concentration and centralization of capital reaches its peak, competition between individual enterprises turns into competition between trusts and ultimately the entire state is organized like one massive ‘collective capitalist’. Bukharin defined such phenomenon as a “state capitalist trust.” At this stage, the state goes beyond simply being a superstructure representing the interests of the capitalist class and transforms into an entity that itself plays the role of ‘collective capital’. In other words, the state steps forward as the core agent of capital accumulation.

While competition is minimized and production is organized within such a state, in the world market, competition between “state capitalist trusts” manifests as imperialist conflicts and even wars.

Therefore, a “state capitalist trust” refers to a state in which the state acts as the owner and direct operator of capital, and state power and the logic of capital are fused into a single, inseparable organism. Ultimately, it is appropriate to understand the “state capitalist trust’ as a complete fusion of the two, which can be expressed as nationalized capital or a capitalized state, rather than just the state or capital alone.

Bukharin premises the fact that capitalism has essentially expanded into a global system (the tendency toward the internationalization of capital). As the flow of commodities, capital, technology, labor and raw materials crosses national borders, the global division of labor in production and exchange deepens. In this process, national economies depend on each other, but this dependence manifests as an intensification of competition rather than harmonious integration. The world economy is established as a single totality (whole), but it does not guarantee peace and balance. Rather, the deeper the global linkages, the greater the ripple effect and intensity of conflicts.

The form of competition changes within the world economy. In traditional free-competition capitalism, many enterprises compete over prices and markets, but as capitalism develops, the concentration and centralization of capital progress, leading to the emergence of corporate groups and competition between these corporate groups is reorganized into competition mediated by the state (nationalization of capital). Thus, the state becomes the core tool of competition. A “state capitalist trust” is formed.

In the imperialist stage centered on the “state capitalist trust,” the state does not serve as a ‘night-watchman state’ but as an apparatus that integrates domestic large capital. Tariffs, subsidies, military procurement, colonial administration, diplomacy, war preparations and credit and monetary policies all become means to prepare the conditions for capital accumulation and competition takes the form of a ‘state-organized capital block versus state-organized capital block’ rather than ‘enterprise versus enterprise’.

Here arises the inevitability of imperialism along with its core contradiction. It is the contradiction resulting from the fact that while production and capital accumulation tend to be integrated on a global scale, they unfold within the divided political framework of nation-states. Capital moves globally in search of larger markets, cheaper raw materials and higher profits, but the actual coercive and organizational power to satisfy these needs remains concentrated in the state. Therefore, the tendency toward the integration of the world economy rather intensifies competition between nation-states, ultimately careening toward armed conflicts over the division and redivision of the world.

What stems from these conflicts is precisely imperialist competition. Imperialist competition is not merely market competition among great powers, nor is it simply a matter of foreign policy choices or territorial expansion. Imperialism must be understood as an expression of internal competition within the world system over the conditions for capital accumulation.

Therefore, imperialist war should not be viewed as an accidental event, such as a leader’s misjudgment or diplomatic failure. As long as large capitals organized as states collide in the world economy and geopolitical arena, war is a recurring product of the imperialist stage. Domestically, it appears as though production is being organized and elements of planning are increasing. But internationally, because such organizing occurs while being divided into national capital blocks, it entails clashes and more destructive armed conflicts. The combination of ‘being organized at the domestic level’ and ‘anarchy at the international level’ breeds war. Thus, war has a structural character. So, it should be considered not an ‘accident’ but the ‘normal’ operation of the system.

If imperialism structurally creates inter-state antagonism and war, then the state within imperialist competition is not a neutral mediator but an apparatus that enforces the interests of domestic large capital within global competition, hence the reformist prescriptions relying on the supra-class nature of the state cannot be a fundamental solution. Rather, working-class revolution and internationalism are the genuine alternatives. The working class should not support their own country’s war but use the imperialist war as an opportunity for their own revolution from an internationalist perspective.

As seen so far, Bukharin’s theory of imperialism posits that the result of the (dialectical) unity of the ‘integration of the world economy’ on one hand and the ‘division and competition of state-organized capital blocks’ on the other inevitably accompanies the arms race and war. His analysis (and Lenin’s, as we will see below) leads us to understand imperialism not as a mere foreign policy but as a specific stage of capitalist development, arriving at the political conclusion of workers’ internationalism and revolution.

Bukharin’s analysis (and Lenin’s too) is particularly persuasive in explaining the so-called ” Thirty Years’ War” from World War I to World War II. Inheriting this approach, we grasp the phenomenon of today’s multinational corporations operating in the global market while simultaneously relying on the diplomatic and military power of their home governments as the essence of imperialism.

Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917)

Vladimir Lenin’s theory of imperialism generally refers to his analyses presented in his work Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, written in the first half of 1916 and published the following year. The core point is as mentioned above: imperialism is not merely some foreign policy line or aggressive tendency of a few countries, but a structural property that emerges when capitalism reaches a certain stage of development.

According to Lenin, imperialism is world capitalism reaching the monopoly stage (a situation where a few companies dominate the world market). In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, capitalism shifted from being competition-centric to monopoly-centric. As the concentration of production and capital intensified, large corporate groups such as trusts and cartels took over the core of industry and monopoly assumed a dominant position (even if competition did not completely disappear). Once it enters the monopoly stage, the very nature of competition changes. It is no longer possible to win the competition merely by selling cheap goods. The outcome of competition depends on the ability to secure sources of raw materials, to block competitors’ access to markets and to mobilize advantageous state ‘connections’.

Furthermore, as banks go beyond simple intermediation to exert control over industry and merge with industrial capital, “finance capital” is formed. ‘Finance capital’ ‘organizes’ the overall economy and combines with state power to seek control over foreign markets and raw materials. The ‘finance capital’ Lenin spoke of (following the Marxist economist Rudolf Hilferding of the time) took the form of a merger between banks and industry at that time. Today, the forms of finance capital have become much more complex, involving the role of central banks, capital market securitization, derivatives, asset management and shadow banking. Nevertheless, the role that finance capital plays in imperialism remains the same. First, finance integrates fragmented pieces of capital into massive financial institutions and links them with national fiscal policy. Second, debt management through the IMF or the World Bank becomes a sort of ‘economic trusteeship’ tool to dominate the economic structures of other countries. Third, the US dollar serves as a geopolitical weapon to isolate hostile nations through the global financial payment network. Finance is now a direct instrument of geopolitical competition.

However, Lenin largely accepted the emphasis on the ‘parasitism’ of finance highlighted by the British left-wing economist John Hobson at the time. Hobson argued that finance capital was a force with interests opposed to those of industrial capital. 21st-century social democrats such as Roh Hoe-chan and Sim Sang-jung also emphasized the parasitism of finance capital and took the lead in strengthening the separation of finance capital and industrial capital. They argued for strong regulations on finance capital by proposing an amendment to the Act on the Structural Improvement of the Financial Industry (Geumsan Act), which would prevent a financial company from owning more than a certain percentage of shares in other companies within the same corporate group.

Lenin argued that in imperialism, where finance capital prevails, the export of capital (especially foreign direct investment) consequently became more important than the export of commodities. The massive capital accumulated in advanced countries is invested in late-developing regions (which were mostly colonies and dependent countries). Giant corporations do not remain confined to their home countries but tend to combine into forms like international cartels and syndicates to divide up markets and sources of raw materials. International monopolies are formed and the world is economically divided.

Alongside economic division, the competition among great powers to politically divide and redivide the territories of colonies and semi-colonies intensifies. In a situation where the divission of the world is already done, a new division attempt immediately emerges as a matter of ‘redivision’ and this competition for redivision structurally breeds war. Here, uneven development becomes Lenin’s core concept. That is, because the different growth rates of each country constantly shake the balance of power among them, the existing world order cannot be fixed and clashes repeatedly occur.

Based on the uneven development of capitalism, Lenin refuted Karl Kautsky’s theory of “ultra-imperialism”—the illusion that the great powers would peacefully jointly manage the world to reduce the costs of war. This is because the difference in the speed of capital accumulation constantly alters the balance of power between states, which inevitably destroys the existing international order and prior agreements.

World War II was a powerful historical confirmation of Lenin’s theory of imperialism. Amid the Great Depression of the 1930s, countries strengthened protectionism, arms buildups and state intervention, which led to the formation of economic blocs and war. Germany and Japan attempted territorial expansion that included even highly industrialized regions in order to secure self-sufficient industrial spheres. The war was not simply about securing colonies, but a struggle for survival among state capitalist blocs. Britain and France entered the war to defend their existing empires, the United States to establish global hegemony and the Soviet Union for industrial and military security.

However, later historians point out that Lenin overgeneralized the extent of capital export at the time. For instance, the United States and Japan were net capital importers until 1914. Furthermore, in the 1930s, Germany (and also Japan) stood out more for its military expansion through the formation of an industrial-military bloc combining the state and heavy industry, rather than for capital export. It is an error to apply the argument that ‘imperialism = the special importance of capital export’ to all cases without modification. Accepting this error as is, some of the South Korean left in the 1990s made the absurd claim that South Korea was an imperialist country.

Later historians also point out that Lenin’s argument that capital export to colonies would promote industrial development there differed from actual reality. After the end of World War II, the industrialization of the Third World (also known as the “Global South” nowadays) occurred only in a handful of countries (dependency theory was flawed in that it overlooked this fact of industrialization, however handful it may be) and it appeared in a delayed or highly distorted form.

After the end of World War II, even though territorial colonialism was dismantled, imperialist domination continued, only changing its form. The arms race during the Cold War was not about securing super-profits (exceptionally high profits exceeding the world average profit), but a systemic competition for strategic superiority. Although military spending far exceeded the profits from overseas investments, it was impossible to reduce due to the structural nature of the competition.

Today’s theory of imperialism must reconstruct Lenin’s narrative centered on territorial division with factors such as networks of military bases; debt and currency subordination; supply chain control; and sanctions and technological blockades. Understanding imperialism solely as territorial occupation misses the reality of the past 80 years. Of course, underestimating the territorial element makes it difficult to explain the coercive power of military and geopolitical forces.

Lenin argued that the super-profits obtained from colonies and dependent countries relatively improved the living conditions of a certain stratum of workers in advanced countries, resulting in the formation of a “labor aristocracy” stratum and that this stratum becomes the material basis for reinforcing reformism and patriotism. He viewed skilled workers in arms industry as the typical ‘labor aristocracy’. They indeed received higher wages, had the highest demand for their labor power during imperialist wars and enjoyed living conditions vastly different from those of the poorest temporary workers. According to the theory of the ‘labor aristocracy’, they were a kind of bought-off existence and thus would never step forward as internationalists. If the ‘labor aristocracy’ theory is correct, at least some of the workers in imperialist countries would have a deep vested interest in their loyalty to imperialism, making them unlikely to stand in solidarity with colonial workers. Rather than helping to overthrow the system, they would try to play a role in defending it. They would reduce Karl Marx’s slogan, “Workers of the world, unite!”, to an empty phrase.

However, toward the end of the First World War, these very workers led the revolutions in both Germany and Russia. It was also them who raised the mass banners of anti-war, anti-Tsar and anti-Kaiser and anti-imperialism. And it was precisely the arms factory workers who came to form the core base of the Bolshevik Party. Lenin’s 1917 appeal, “All power to the Soviets (councils)!”, was initially targeted at the workers of war supply factories.

Regarding some minor errors committed when defining imperialism, we must consider that Lenin himself added a caveat that definitions generally have a conditional and relative nature. In particular, we must take into account that his work Imperialism was not a strictly rigorous theoretical final version but a “popular outline” (as the subtitle suggests). Lenin’s core concepts themselves are neither undermined nor tarnished. That is, what he saw as the essence of imperialism is that imperialism is monopoly capitalism. And Lenin emphasized that monopoly capitals (trusts, cartels, etc.) do not simply dominate markets but are closely integrated with the state machine.

In particular, in The State and Revolution and The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It, he emphasized that the wartime economic conditions forced by the First World War strengthened the state’s economic control and as this combined with the interests of monopoly capital, “state monopoly capitalism” was formed. In their co-authored book A Short History of Socialist Economic Thought, Hardach and Karras correctly point out that the Stalinist communist parties’ ‘theory of state monopoly capitalism’ committed the error of generalizing what Lenin had argued in relation to specific wartime economic conditions into a general law of capitalist development. It is safe to view Lenin’s “state monopoly capitalism” as the same concept as Bukharin’s “state capitalist trust’.

The strength of Lenin’s theory of imperialism as monopoly capitalism lies in its attempt to grasp imperialism not merely as a foreign policy, but as a connected system of changes in capital accumulation, state power, international competition, war and colonial oppression. Lenin concluded that since imperialism is a specific stage of capitalism, anti-war and anti-imperialist movements are connected not just to moral opposition, but to the question of critique against the system and revolutionary strategy. In addition, he recognized the liberation struggles of colonial and oppressed nations as crucial links that weaken the imperialist system.

Chris Harman and the Constructive Succession of Classical Imperialism Theory

Luxemburg, Bukharin and Lenin defined the core features of imperialism at the time as the formation and dominance of monopoly capital and the competition to divide colonies. They viewed that as capitalism advances, it becomes difficult to sustain accumulation solely with the domestic market and as capital expands to abroad, military conflicts between states become inevitable.

Chris Harman sees this insight as still valid, yet pays attention to the fact that since capitalism does not stop at a specific stage but is constantly reorganized, imperialism also takes different forms depending on the era. From this perspective, one can easily see that the expectations harbored by many after the end of the Cold War—that the era of imperialism had ended and that ‘globalization’ and international organizations (the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the European Union, etc.) would ease conflicts between states and make peace possible—were an illusion. The military interventions by the West centered around the United States, the Iraq War, the financial crisis, the Ukraine War and the US-China rivalry have rather deepened tensions between great powers. Neoliberal globalization was a process that unfolded simultaneously with imperialist competition. Capital intertwines with each other through global supply chains, but it is precisely that interdependence that triggers fiercer inter-state competition in times of crisis. Globalization did not weaken the state but rather rearmed it.

In Harman’s analysis, US hegemony, in particular, remains an important example. The United States has led the world order through military power, the financial system and the dollar’s international currency status. This is not the ‘Empire’ spoken of by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, but the role of a hegemonic state building an international framework that guarantees the accumulation of its own capital. However, Harman emphasizes that this hegemony is not stable. Other great powers, especially China and Russia, pursue their respective interests and challenge the US-centered order. As a result, the world system is placed in an unstable state where cooperation and competition are mixed. Imperialism is not a unified rule but a dynamic field where multiple states constantly vie for power.

Harman, too, does not view imperialism through the framework of economic determinism. It is true that economic interests are the underlying drivers, but states also respond to non-economic factors such as security, strategy and ideology (for example, hostility toward Cuba). War and military intervention are not always determined by immediate profit calculations. Economic factors such as securing profits and natural resources also ultimately operate within the international state system. The state must guarantee the general conditions for capital accumulation and in the process of carrying out that task, it makes diplomatic and military choices. Therefore, politics and economics are not separate spheres but different expressions of the same system.

Ultimately, imperialism is a specific stage of capitalist development and a persistent structural tendency, resulting from the global expansion of capital accumulation manifesting as competition between states. The global economy must be understood within these dynamics of imperialism. This classical Marxist perspective allows us to explain today’s wars, trade disputes, financial crises and conflicts between alliances within a single integrated framework (as Harman emphasizes).

Therefore, the answer to the question of what imperialism is becomes clear. Imperialism is not the excessive greed or anomalous violence of great powers, but the ‘normal’ way the capitalist world system operates. It is a systemic reality in which capital seeks to reorganize the world for profit, the state attempts to support and organize that process and as a result, competition and conflict are constantly reproduced. Imperialism is not the past but the present and not a specific region but a global network of relations. Understanding imperialism is the starting point for properly recognizing today’s international politics and economy and seeking alternatives.

Harman’s analysis of imperialism also liberates imperialism from moral condemnation or conspiratorial explanations. Imperialism does not stem from the malice or mistakes of a few greedy leaders (even if that happens to be Trump). Imperialism inevitably arises from the way capitalism is organized on a global scale. As long as capital accumulation continues, competition between states and military tensions are bound to repeat. Thus, to end imperialism, it is not enough to simply change policies or replace leaders. The overthrow of the system itself is required.

Even though it was written at the time when the U.S. occupied Iraq and declared ‘victory’ in 2003, Chris Harman foresees the future ten years later as follows. The U.S. invasion of Iraq, rather than stabilizing the imperialist system in the long run, will instead amplify new contradictions. Controlling Iraqi oil will not raise the rate of profit for U.S. capitalism. This is especially true if the instability and social upheaval resulting from the occupation spread to other parts of the Middle East. However, for the U.S. to retreat from the occupation of Iraq would mean abandoning the gains from its military gamble and risking a cumulative loss of influence over other countries and regions. For these reasons, a victorious America is still a weak America. Divisions with other great powers will continue and divisions will re-emerge even among those in power in the U.S. Of course, this will make it easier for resistance against them to spread globally. However, “a wounded beast will not make the world less barbaric.”

Furthermore, Harman already challenges the view of the modern world order as a U.S. unipolar system at the time of writing. The world harbors a multipolar structure in which multiple imperialist states compete. China and Russia are rising as challengers. China is expanding its influence based on economic growth and Russia is using its military tradition and energy resources as weapons to create fissures in U.S. dominance. Although Harman’s analysis was presented in 2003, it provides insights that seem to have foreseen today’s U.S.-China hegemonic conflict and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Harman’s work is a major theoretical achievement that reinterprets and develops the classical Marxist theory of imperialism under the conditions of the 21st century. First, it maintains a dialectical perspective that grasps imperialism as a structural product of capitalist accumulation without falling into economic reductionism. Second, while critically inheriting the classical theories of Lenin and Bukharin, it highlights the importance of state capitalist competition in particular. Third, it explains the historical transition process of imperialism—from the Cold War and decolonization to globalization—within a consistent theoretical framework. Fourth, its theoretical analysis does not stop at academic inquiry but holds practical implications that contribute to formulating strategies for the anti-war and anti-capitalist movements. Harman’s analysis of imperialism provides radical insights for fundamentally reorganizing the order of the modern world, where the state and capital remain closely linked.

Alex Callinicos’s Imperialism and Global Political Economy: The Unity of Economic and Geopolitical Competition

Alex Callinicos posits a dual competition under capitalism: ‘economic competition’ and ‘geopolitical competition’. Economic competition among capitals is the process by which individual capitals cross borders in search of markets, resources and cheap labor for profitable businesses. This stems from the inherently expansionist nature of capitalism. Geopolitical competition among states is the process by which sovereign states mobilize military means to defend their territorial power, security and rank within the international system.

David Harvey also explains this using a similar framework to Callinicos. However, Harvey called them the “logic of capital” and the “logic of territory,” respectively. Yet, first, Harvey posits these two logics dichotomously. In Harvey’s model, the logic of territory appears as a separate principle operating outside of capitalism. Thus, the actions of the state are sometimes depicted as clashing with the demands of capital, or the state is described as moving independently. Geopolitics is treated as an autonomous cause external to capitalism.

However, the two logics must be understood in an integrated manner. Geopolitical competition existed even before capitalism. But with the advent of capitalism, state power aids capital accumulation and the expansion of capital elevates the state’s status, intertwining the two competitions inextricably. Wars and conflicts between states ultimately reflect the economic interests of the capitalist system or take place within its framework. Therefore, geopolitical competition between states is an advanced form of competition between capitals. In other words, geopolitical competition and economic competition are not two separate logics, but two aspects of the single essence of the capitalist system manifesting in international society.

Second, Harvey characterizes modern imperialism as “accumulation by dispossession.” This refers to the method by which capital absorbs value not through normal exploitation via the production process, but through the privatization of public goods, asset stripping, financial fraud and so on.

However, Harvey overestimates the extension of accumulation by dispossession. In doing so, he neglects expanded reproduction, which is the core driving force of capitalism. Accumulation by dispossession has always existed as an incidental phenomenon in the history of capitalism. Emphasizing it as if it were a new logic of modern capitalism will lead to a misunderstanding of the nature of the crisis. Indeed, Harvey views capitalist crises primarily as a problem arising from overaccumulated capital finding nowhere to go (rather than from the tendency of the rate of profit to fall). To resolve this, he argues that capital engages in accumulation by dispossession or makes a “spatio-temporal fix.” The “spatio-temporal fix” is Harvey’s term for the process of constructing new spaces or securing investment destinations to absorb surplus capital and lay a new foundation for accumulation during capitalist crises. Harvey also views China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a typical “spatio-temporal fix.” He argues that China seeks geographical expansion by building large-scale infrastructure (such as roads, railways, ports, power, telecommunications and water and sewage systems) to discharge its internally overaccumulated capital externally.

Third, Harvey thus understands crises excessively as issues of circulation and spatial relocation. However, the fundamental cause of crises is the tendential fall in the rate of profit in the sphere of production. For Harvey, imperialism is a strategy of spatial expansion to resolve the overaccumulation of capital. But in our view, imperialism is a geopolitical arena of contestation where large capitals, facing the crisis of falling profitability, mobilize state machines to wage a struggle for survival against one another.

Fourth and finally, for Harvey, who emphasizes accumulation by dispossession, the subject of resistance naturally becomes the dispossessed “people” or “local communities” rather than the working class. This weakens the strategic centrality of the working class.

Ultimately, unlike Harvey’s “political economy of space,” our method adheres to the classical position that Marx’s “laws of motion of capitalism” must be thoroughly applied to the question of imperialism. Viewing world politics through Harvey’s framework allows us to understand how the strategic choices and geopolitical ambitions of state leaders shake up the economy, but it fails to penetrate the logic of competitive capital accumulation and class interests underlying all this chaos.

On the other hand, viewed through the framework of the “unity (with tension) of economic and geopolitical logics” presented by Alex Callinicos, the nature of the US-China hegemonic rivalry can be understood very well. The US-China conflict is grasped not as a confrontation between “democracy vs. authoritarianism,” but as a clash between an established imperialist power (the US) and an emerging imperialist power (China). Contrary to the past predictions of dependency theory, China has successfully accumulated capital within the world system to lay a massive industrial foundation. Now, moving beyond low value-added production, Chinese capital is competing directly with US capital in high-tech sectors (AI, semiconductors), which is the result of the intensification of competition between capitals on a global scale. Meanwhile, economic growth inevitably leads to the expansion of state influence. China’s BRI is a national strategy aimed at fracturing the US-led geopolitical order. The US considers this a substantial threat to its hegemony and is responding through “supply chain decoupling” (a term effectively meaning the exclusion of China) or military containment. The US-China conflict is a quintessential example showing how aggressively state machine can be to protect the interests of its national capital once capital accumulation reaches a certain level.

Therefore, China should not be seen simply as a state expanding spatially due to an overflow of capital, but as a state-capitalist imperialist state where the state machine and capital accumulation are extremely closely integrated. The US-China conflict should not be viewed as a separation of the two logics (the logic of capital and the logic of territory) as Harvey does, but rather as a contest over which side—US capital or Chinese capital—will appropriate more of the global surplus value, manifesting as geopolitical and military conflict.

Thus, today’s US-China conflict is the epitome of imperialist dynamics. The US is waging an economic war of controlling semiconductor supply chains to prevent China’s technological rise from encroaching on the profits of its domestic corporations. At the same time, it is building a geopolitical encirclement known as the Indo-Pacific strategy. China is also countering this through the BRI. The conflict between the two states is an imperialist antagonism over the control of global supply chains.

The Global South and Left Nationalism

The logic of the “development of underdevelopment,” the core argument of dependency theory, has been widely criticized over the past thirty or forty years. Countries in the Global South are not simply trapped in a permanent state of underdevelopment. In fact, a significant level of industrialization took place in places like South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and Mexico in the 1970s and 1980s (the emergence of “Newly Industrializing Countries” or NICs).

However, this industrialization did not occur in a direction that fundamentally improved the lives of the masses there. Rather, it deepened a social structure in which the local ruling class colluded with multinational corporations and/or imperialist states to exploit and oppress their own masses, including the working class. The fruits of industrialization were concentrated in the hands of a small elite, while the masses continued to suffer from poverty and inequality.

However, the relationship between imperialism and the ruling classes of emerging countries should not be viewed as a simple, one-sided relationship of domination and subordination. The local ruling class strengthens its economic and political position through its links with imperialism and on this basis, exploits and oppresses its own masses. Therefore, imperialism is not merely an external force but is closely intertwined with the domestic social structure.

The suffering and resistance of the masses in the Global South were crucial to the rise of the wave of the “alter-globalization movement” that swept the world in the first decade of the 21st century. At the same time, nationalism, the ideology of developmentalist local capital there, is increasingly becoming a double-edged sword. The masses, suffering from exploitation, oppression and corruption, begin to turn nationalism against the most hated figures of the local ruling class. Left-wing nationalism often inspires the masses to begin fighting them, but the notion that there is a common “national interest” binding exploiters and the exploited leaves the masses defenseless against the subtle political maneuvers of the very local “progressive” politicians who are collaborating with imperialism. However, it must be recognized that the local ruling class and the state are agents of exploitation and oppression. They collaborate with imperialism and pass on its oppression and exploitation to the local masses. They do so not because they have forgotten some sort of “national interest,’ but for the sake of their own interests.

Lenin urged the workers’ movement in imperialist countries to view anti-imperialist movements in colonial and dependent countries as allies. However, he strongly opposed “painting in red” the “bourgeois-nationalist’ tendencies commonly seen in liberation movements in those countries. This point must be borne in mind today as well. (This point is particularly relevant with regard to Vijay Prashad, who will be discussed below.)

Vijay Prashad’s “Hyper-imperialism”

Vijay Prashad has been regarded as an important writer representing the Global South. His writings have challenged mainstream discourse. Prashad’s theory of imperialism is encapsulated in the concept of “Hyper-imperialism.” According to Prashad, this is a new stage of capitalism today that goes beyond classical imperialism, having evolved into a “single, integrated bloc” with the United States at its apex, unlike in the past. While competition among imperialist states was the core in the past, he argues that currently, NATO, the Five Eyes (explained below), Japan and others are united into a single “Global North bloc” centered around the United States. The purpose of this bloc is to defend the declining economic hegemony of the United States through military and political means. (As I will elaborate later, it is bizarre that Prashad talks about a “bloc’ even while observing the manner and attitude with which the US under Trump treats its European allies.)

According to Prashad, the “Global North,” which holds monopolies over finance and science and technology, continues its resource extraction, while Global South countries are unable to exercise their sovereignty and remain trapped in a structure of expropriation and wealth drain similar to the old colonial era. At the same time, Prashad points to debt as the most powerful weapon of modern imperialism. He points out that the external debt of the Global South amounts to approximately $11.4 trillion and most of their export earnings (about 98 percent) are used to pay off debt interest. This makes it impossible for these countries to invest in welfare or infrastructure for their own people.

In addition, Prashad explains that imperialism mobilizes not only direct military invasions but also various non-military means (“hybrid war”). This includes economic sanctions, “lawfare’ that uses the law as a weapon and the manipulation of public opinion through the control of information and media. Furthermore, the “imperialist bloc” (the Global North) suffocates the economies of countries that oppose its interests (such as Venezuela, Cuba and Iran) and causes internal chaos to induce regime change.

Prashad interprets the reason why recent US foreign policy targets China and Russia from his own perspective. When China and Russia present a new model of economic cooperation that does not rely on the Western financial system (the IMF, dollar hegemony), the “imperialist bloc” views this as an existential threat to its hegemony and seeks to contain it. In response, Prashad argues that the Global South countries must unite once again to build a “New International Economic Order (NIEO)’ and restore their sovereignty.

The Five Eyes refers to the world’s largest classified intelligence-sharing alliance centered around the United States. It is also the core intelligence and military network of the “Global North bloc” mentioned by Vijay Prashad. Its main composition consists of five English-speaking countries: the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The Five Eyes is extremely important to the “Global North bloc,’ including the US. According to Prashad, the Five Eyes is the physical foundation of the “hyper-imperialism” built by the US to control the world. Through this intelligence network, the US monitors the movements of Global South countries challenging its hegemony and obtains intelligence to wage hybrid wars (economic sanctions, lawfare, etc.).

However, in my view, while the Five Eyes is a symbol showing the cohesion of the “US bloc” in the geopolitical competition among imperialist states, it must be understood in terms of an intelligence war among imperialist powers, because competing powers like China and Russia are also trying to build their own intelligence networks.

Prashad also points out that imperialism is not simply an economic phenomenon but is based on racism — the attitude of Western elites refusing to acknowledge the exercise of sovereignty by nations of color underlies modern imperialist policies.

To summarize, Vijay Prashad’s theory of imperialism can be defined as a system in which an integrated, US-led imperialist “bloc” mobilizes finance (debt), military power and hybrid wars to plunder the resources of the Global South and obstruct its sovereign development.

Evaluating Vijay Prashad’s theory of imperialism based on the theory of imperialism I explained above, his theory captures modern, complex financial expropriation well, but from the perspective of the classical theory of imperialism, several major flaws are found.

First, Prashad views imperialism not as a “competition among multiple great powers” but as a “single bloc.” He defines the current world as a single, US-led hyper-imperialist bloc. However, the classical theory of imperialism sees this differently. Imperialism is not a single domination but a dynamic arena where multiple states (including China) constantly vie for power. Prashad views China as an alternative force standing against imperialism. He has supported the Chinese Communist Party, while defending the criminal Assad regime in Syria.

Although Prashad frequently criticizes Indian domestic politics, particularly the Islamophobia of the far-right Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), he consistently downplays or even defends the Chinese government’s actions regarding its oppression of the Uyghurs (who are almost all Muslims) and its denial of their religious and civil liberties. He claims that the Chinese government’s oppression of the Uyghurs is a US media conspiracy and argues that the Uyghurs’ “cultural exceptionalism hinders economic development.” Regarding the rights of Tibetans, he remains silent.

China has long been one of Prashad’s main blind spots. For Prashad, who is a campist, the Chinese Communist Party is a checker and balancer against US imperialism and therefore the left must turn a blind eye even if China acts in an “un-Marxist” manner.

Defenders of the Chinese Communist Party view China as a transitional society between full socialism and market socialism and consider the Chinese Communist Party a liberating force that will, over time, lead the Global South to socialism. Prashad also tends to view the former Soviet Union and contemporary China as catalysts for the global socialist movement. In the past, he did not acknowledge the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989) as an imperialist act.

Prashad has yet to raise a clear voice regarding the dispossession of indigenous peoples in Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura, where his own party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)], has been in power for decades.

Unlike Prashad, we define China as a state capitalist and imperialist country. The US-China conflict is not a confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism, but a typical imperialist clash between an established power and an emerging power. If one views the world solely as the US bloc versus the rest, like Prashad does, there is a risk of falling into the campist logic that overlooks the imperialist nature of emerging powers (China, Russia).

The argument that inclines Prashad toward campism goes like this. He often develops his argument by framing the world in a “Global North bloc, including the US, versus the Global South (Third World)” dynamic. However, imperialism is not merely an order in which the core exploits the periphery; it is a system in which competing units of closely tied big capital and the state fight each other for influence by mobilizing military, diplomatic and economic means. On the other hand, the more Prashad’s thesis focuses on criticizing US hegemony, the more easily he misunderstands imperialism as a US policy line. This increases the danger of falling prey to reformist ideas (such as reforming the international organizations). Such confusion confounds anti-imperialist strategy, leaning toward the campist logic that “any state opposing the US is relatively progressive.” However, if competition between major powers is built into the global capitalist system, “anti-Americanism” does not simply equal “anti-imperialism.” The moment more than one major power exists, the oppressed peoples of the world must not center on “which side to take,” but on “how to intervene with an independent class politics that is not subordinated to any ruling class.”

The vocabulary frequently seen in Prashad’s writings includes categories such as “neo-colony,” “dependency,” and “periphery.” Of course, such categories do capture an aspect of real-world inequality. Yet, lumping together many post-colonial countries and calling them “neo-colonies” misses the truth. Defining regimes like Nasser’s Egypt or Nehru’s India as neo-colonies/semi-colonies must even be called a distortion. They sought to establish independent centers of capital accumulation, not just political independence and were not mere puppets within a world dominated by major powers. More importantly, some post-colonial countries actually ascended to a “second tier’ of advanced capitalism (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Brazil, Mexico and coastal China since the 1990s, etc.). If this fact is not faced head-on, we are left with poor tools to analyze countries like today’s China. As a result, false characterizations like “the leading state of the anti-imperialist camp” replace genuine analysis.

Prashad excels at historically rehabilitating “Third World” projects such as Bandung, the Non-Aligned Movement and Tricontinental. However, the moment anti-imperialism is immediately replaced by a national alliance of almost all classes (the “people”), the independence of the working class (and the plight of the structurally discriminated masses) is easily subordinated to state projects. Latin America’s “anti-imperialist” nationalism and import substitution industrialization strategies often assumed in reality an alliance of almost all classes and as a result, they came to resemble the Communist Party-style schema of an alliance with the “progressive’ national bourgeoisie. In particular, developmentalist regimes like those of Vargas and Perón were not fundamentally hostile to Western capitalism and they often used “anti-imperialist” rhetoric to reorganize the wealth of their own ruling class and divide the labor movement.

Restoring the ideologies of “Third World solidarity” (sovereignty, development, peaceful coexistence) could be considered inevitable, but unless we also analyze the class costs (coercive accumulation, wage suppression, state violence, control of the labor movement) at which they were actually pursued, today’s strategy will regress back to the prescription of “steering the state in a good direction.” When state-led development projects fail, if that failure is automatically explained solely by “imperialist interference,” the responsibility of the domestic ruling class and the importance of domestic class struggle are obscured.

Second, Prashad does not see the cause of the crisis as the falling rate of profit, but rather as “debt and expropriation.” He emphasizes financial subjugation and expropriation through “debt.” This aligns with David Harvey’s “accumulation by dispossession.” Above, I criticized Harvey’s theory, emphasizing that the root cause of imperialism lies not in circulation or dispossession, but in the tendency of the rate of profit to fall in the realm of production. Debt and financial sanctions are merely means of imperialism. Viewing them as the root cause leads to neglecting expanded reproduction, the core driver of capitalism, thereby causing a misunderstanding of the nature of the crisis. Imperialist war, too, is not simply for stealing resources, but is something that occurs during the process of globally competing by mobilizing state power to defend against the falling rate of profit.

Prashad often explains imperialism in a way that emphasizes the IMF, debt, restructuring and institutional dependence. However, if imperialism is narrowed down solely to finance, debt and institutions, the material motives for the imperialist wars taking places like in the Middle East (which is oil) become blurred. It fails to explain why geopolitics, particularly concerning oil, became central in the post-war world and how military power, alliances and proxy wars were concentrated on that point. Since the 1970s, the decisive “gulf” has been the Persian Gulf, not the Gulf of Mexico, and attempts to control the policies of the countries in that region have been carried out through bribery, threats, arms sales and the dispatch of military advisors, with wars decisive to the world system repeatedly occurring in that region.

Therefore, the more Prashad’s theory of imperialism leans towards institutions, debt and terms of trade, the weaker the persuasiveness of his explanation as to why wars occur so repeatedly, why specific regions structurally become the focus of wars and why military competition is a core mechanism rather than a byproduct of the system. From the standpoint of the state capitalism theory based on the classical theory of imperialism, military power is not a policy option but the essence and means of competition.

Third, for Prashad, the subject of resistance is the Global South states, not the international working class. He presents the sovereignty of the Global South states and a new Non-Aligned Movement as alternatives. This perspective can fall into the trap of left-wing nationalism. However, the ruling classes of the Global South are also entities that exploit and oppress their own masses, colluding with imperialism or competing for their own interests. Nationalism that emphasizes “national interests” can become an ideology that binds exploiters and the exploited together, blocking the independent struggle of the working class. True anti-imperialism goes beyond defending the sovereignty of specific nations; it is the solidarity and revolution of the international working class challenging the competitive accumulation system itself.

To summarize: Prashad’s theory has successfully exposed the brutality of imperialism and financial inequality. This is a great achievement. Nevertheless, I emphasize that imperialism is the “normal” operating mode of capitalism. If imperialism were simply a bad policy of the “hyper-imperialism” of the United States, its dangers could be somewhat resolved by a change of government, but if imperialism is an inevitable attribute of the system, the threat can only be eliminated by abolishing the system itself. Prashad’s theory leaves much room for drifting into “Campism” and “anti-American independence,’ and there is a concern that it neglects the relations of production and class struggle, which are the core of Marxism.

As long as capital’s need for infinite accumulation and the state’s will to power are combined, war, expropriation (dispossession) and arms races cannot be stopped. Imperialism is the political and military expression of the inter-state competition that inevitably arises when capitalism expands on a global scale and war is the extreme form of this competition. Therefore, the core message of the Marxist theory of imperialism is that effective resistance against imperialism is possible through a fundamental challenge to the capitalist system itself. True anti-imperialism must go beyond simply criticizing a specific country (even if it is the United States under Trump) and challenge the competitive accumulation system itself.

In conclusion, from our perspective, Vijay Prashad sharply criticizes the phenomena of imperialism (financial expropriation, U.S. hegemony), but places more weight on the geopolitical realignment among nations (multipolarity) as its solution. To summarize the political differences between him and us:

1. The criterion for anti-imperialism must be redefined not as “anti-Americanism” but as “workers’ internationalism.” If imperialism is built into the system, the moment the masses rely on any “counter-hegemonic power,” they are co-opted into the strategy of that nation’s ruling class.
2. The class character and oppression within Global South societies must also be examined. National liberation and development have always been accompanied by class struggle and have often been pursued in forms that oppress the working class. Overlooking this issue causes the strategy to regress into a popular front.
3. Imperialism should not be narrowed solely to the relationship of expropriation and wealth drain, but the logic of competition and war must be restored to its central axis. Many on the left, by defining imperialism only as the exploitation of the Third World, have obscured the imperialist powers’ pursuit of hegemony, tendency toward armed provocation and instinct for war, retreating into a variation of Kautsky’s theory of “ultra-imperialism.”
4. The post-colonial differentiation must be placed at the forefront. Lumping things together under the category of “neo-colony” fails to explain the emergence of new centers of capital accumulation such as South Korea, Taiwan and China.

Implications for South Korea and the South Korean Working Class

The framework of the (dialectical) unity of the logic of economic competition and the logic of geopolitical competition is also useful for analyzing South Korea’s predicament. This difficulty can be understood not merely as a matter of diplomatic maneuvering, but as an expression of the structural contradictions faced by South Korean capitalism. The essence of this contradiction is the clash between economic logic and geopolitical logic on a global level. Imperialism encompasses a structure where these two logics interlock. South Korea is situated at the very point where these two logics create the sharpest tension.

From an economic logic, South Korea’s big capital (Samsung, SK, Hyundai Motor, LG, etc.) is deeply integrated into the massive Chinese market and supply chains to gain profit. Capital, regardless of nationality, seeks to move to where profits are generated and economic decoupling from China would bring about a crisis of capital accumulation. From a geopolitical logic, the typical features of military and territorial competition are revealed. The South Korean state has absolutely relied on the military protection of the United States (the ROK-U.S. alliance) to survive among neighboring great powers. Thus, there has been a desperate tightrope walk by the South Korean ruling class trying not to lose neither the economic interest (China) nor the national security (the U.S.) — the South Korean style of “strategic ambiguity.”

However, this does not mean that South Korea is subjugated to the United States. Not anymore. Although South Korea cannot be counted among the imperialist states, it ranks 5th in the world in terms of military power, solidifying its “Top 5” status for three consecutive years. And in terms of economic power, South Korea is a major economy ranking 12th to 13th in the world. Therefore, South Korea is not simply a puppet following U.S. orders. The recent large-scale arms exports to Poland or the expansion of economic influence in Southeast Asia show that South Korea itself has independent motives to pursue its “national interests’ to expand its own economic and military interests.

Taking advantage of the fact that South Korean capitalism now has increased leverage within the world system, South Korea state has sometimes sought to extract more concessions from both the US and China by maintaining “strategic ambiguity.” Such behavior is part of wider pattern in which some peripheral countries exploit the fissures between core countries to elevate the position of their own capital. However, we currently seem to have entered a period where geopolitical competition overwhelms economic competition. The US’s determination not to tolerate China’s dominance in high-tech sectors can be seen as a declaration that it will prioritize geopolitical victory to secure economic supremacy. As the US-China hegemonic competition intensifies, the room for maneuver in the “strategic ambiguity” enjoyed by the South Korean ruling class narrows. South Korea is already facing strong structural pressure to side with one party (primarily the US), even at the cost of economic losses. This means that the conflict over diplomatic lines within South Korea (the so-called difference in diplomatic lines between the Pro-alliance Faction vs. the Self-reliance Faction) is, in fact, a debate over survival strategies within the South Korean ruling class.

However, the working class and the left must not be swayed by the Lee Jae-myung government’s tightrope walking. To do so, first, they must recognize that the “national interest” is an illusion. What the “national interest” is, in fact, the profits of the South Korean capitalist class and the power of the state machine. All that returns to the working class and other ordinary people are the risks of war and economic instability. After all, South Korea’s strategic ambiguity is a microcosm of the world imperialist system in crisis. When the system was stable, it was possible to profit from both sides, but as the system falls into crisis, ambiguity can instead become a vulnerability that invites attacks from both sides.

However, with Trump’s predatory imperialism, patriotism (which also puts forward the concept of “national interest”) is gaining ground even among the South Korean left. (The New Right’s one-sided absurdity that imperialism developed South Korea is not worth addressing here.) While Marxist internationalism views history as the history of class struggle, left-wing patriotism (nationalism) sets its unit of analysis as “state versus state” or “dominant state versus subordinate state.” Subordination theory has replaced the Marxist concept of “class” with “nation.” Consequently, rather than focusing on the independent struggle of the working class—the oppressed and exploited class—it commits the error of conflating the interests of the domestic middle class (and some domestic capitalists) with those of the working class within the framework of a “plundered” or “looted’ nation.

Subordination theory shifts all blame to external factors (imperialist plunder or looting). Thus, while it succeeds in exposing the predatory nature of imperialism, it neglects Marxist methods such as relations of production and class struggle. However, a country’s development or underdevelopment is influenced more by its internal class structure and level of productive forces than by its foreign trade terms. Revolutionary Marxism emphasizes that the liberation of a country subjected to imperialist interference is not merely independence from the US state or Western capital, but a workers’ revolution that dismantles the domestic class structure and fundamentally transforms the relations of production.

However, subordination theory tends to present a break from imperialism (especially “anti-American independence”) as the solution, which means joining the international anti-American camp in accordance with Campist logic rather than a strategy of revolution from below. However, Campism must be rejected. Siding with the US is not defending “democracy,” nor is siding with China or Russia “anti-imperialism.” Both sides are merely imperialist powers dreaming of capital accumulation and the expansion of their influence. Internationalism is indeed the true alternative. South Korean workers must focus on a movement to halt this disastrous imperialist competition itself in solidarity with the working classes of the US and China, rather than with their own country’s “progressive” politicians.

Further Reading

• Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. This book serves as a standard guide for those exploring various Marxist theories of imperialism. It stands out for its clear summaries of the classical theories of Luxemburg, Hilferding, Lenin and Bukharin. Although it also covers Baran, Sweezy and Frank’s dependency theory; Wallerstein’s world-systems theory; and Emmanuel and Amin’s theory of unequal exchange, all which dominated the 1960s and 70s, there is no need to struggle to read these latter theories from the very beginning.

• Chris Harman, ‘Analysing Imperialism’, International Socialism, Summer 2003.

• Nikolai Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, 1917.

• Vladimir Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1917.

• Alex Callinicos, Imperialism and Global Political Economy, Polity, 2009. (It has the drawback of being academic, but if you exercise patience and read it closely, there is much to be gained.)

• G. Hardach & D. Karras, A Short History of Socialist Economic Thought, Hodder & Stoughton Educational, 1979.