서부지법 폭동과 21대 대선 결과를 계기로 2030 남성이 “더 보수화” “극우화”했다는 주장이 상식처럼 됐습니다. 서부지법 난입자 중 2030 남성이 적잖이 있던 것은 사실이고, 대선 출구 조사에서도 2030 남성 60~70퍼센트가 김문수와 이준석에 투표한 것으로 나타났습니다.
그러나 서부지법 폭동 등 극우 부상이 2030 남성 문제일까요? 이준석과 김문수에 투표한 2030 남성들은 극우일까요? 극우가 2030 남성의 지지를 얻으려는 것에 좌파는 어떻게 대처해야 할까요? 2030 남성 극우화 논란을 둘러싼 현실과 이면을 살펴보려 합니다.
23 July(Wed) 2025, 7:30pm | Speaker: Lee Jae Hyuk (Workers' Solidarity Students Group activist, one of the 20/30s who protested Lee Jun-seok’s campaign rally near Korea Univ.)
After the Seoul Western District Court riot and the 21st presidential election, it has become almost common sense to claim that young men have become “more conservative” or even “far right.” Indeed, not a few of the court rioters were men in their 20/30s, and exit polls showed that 60-70% of 20/30s men voted for Kim Moon-soo or Lee Jun-seok.
But is the court riot or the rise of the far right really a problem of young men? Are 20/30s men who voted Lee Jun-seok or Kim Moon-soo actually far right? How should the left respond to the far right’s efforts to win over young men? We will explore the realities and what's behind the debate over whether young men are shifting to the far right.
