노동자 연대

전체 기사
노동자연대 단체
노동자연대TV
IST
윤석열 퇴진 운동 2023~24년 팔레스타인 투쟁과 중동 트럼프 2기 이주민·난민 우크라이나 전쟁

Urgent Action(UA) must retract its decision of “no solidarity with Workers’ Solidarity”
We demand Jeon Ji-yun’s apology for spreading lies

1. A destructive move that breeds hostility among Palestine solidarity activists

Urgent Action by South Korean Civil Society in Solidarity with Palestine (hereafter UA) made a decision on November 5 to “rule out solidarity (co-operation) with Workers’ Solidarity.” The statement was published without so much as a title, possibly out of guilty conscience

Workers’ Solidarity (hereafter WS) has been working for over a year to build the Palestine solidarity movement as an active part of People in Solidarity with Palestinians (PSP). PSP currently involves Palestinians and Arabs living in Korea as well as 44 Korean civic groups.

In the days following October 7 last year, before PSP was launched, WS invited BDS Korea and other organizations currently in UA to jointly organize solidarity action. BDS Korea refused.

Thus their decision formalizes what they have been doing anyway, but the timing is suggestive. UA and PSP each held their national days of action to commemorate year one of the Gaza genocide on October 5 and 6, respectively. Hankyoreh’s October 7th issue featured a big picture of the PSP rally on its front page, while the weekly Sisain described the PSP rally as “the biggest antiwar rally to take place in Korea in the year since the start of the war in Gaza.” UA subsequently called the meeting where the decision to “rule out working with WS” was taken.

Mere coincidence?

UA proclaims itself “Korean civil society in solidarity with Palestine.” But far from representing civil society in the Gramscian sense of institutions such as churches, schools, media, political parties, and trade unions, UA doesn’t even represent most Korean civic groups.

Moreover, although UA claims the decision was adopted at its general meeting, only 20 of UA’s 218 member organizations showed up at the meeting. In other words, fewer than ten percent of UA’s groups proclaimed themselves the ‘general meeting’. Almost none of the groups represented at the meeting had any mass base (with accordingly large responsibility). It’s also questionable whether the participants voted as proper delegates of their respective organizations. There is a known case of a UA meeting participant voting without being delegated by their organization; their vote was eventually deleted from the records after being challenged by members of the same organization.

As some groups were opposed to the decision, UA chose to ratify it by majority vote. Since when did UA institute such a democratic decision-making procedure? In the past UA settled disagreements by unanimity (consensus). For instance, when consensus could not be reached on their position regarding Hamas’ October 7 attack (and more generally regarding Hamas itself), UA chose not to adopt a position on the matter.

Above all, the accusation of ‘secondary aggression against a victim of sexual violence’ directed to WS has nothing to do with UA’s founding purpose (solidarity with Palestine). Imagine how careless UA would appear as a coalition if it were to haggle over its position on the Ukraine war. Although some groups in UA seem to treat sexual violence as a matter of exceptional importance, their presence does not make the question of ‘secondary aggression’ any more relevant to the purpose of the coalition (we shall return to this point later).

2. It is simply a lie that WS committed ‘secondary aggression against a victim of sexual violence’

One such ‘sexual violence exceptionalist’ is Jeon Ji-yun (man in his 50s, former WS member), a schemer who is active in UA. He has been framing WS as a sort of secretive group of conspirators who covered up a horrific rape committed by one of its members in 2003, shielding the perpetrator and attacking the victim for unchaste behavior. In propagating this story Jeon was abusing a widespread misperception and stereotype about revolutionary leftist (especially Leninist) organizations.(which he also exploited during his trial.)

In painting WS as a criminal organization, Jeon also skillfully exploited the prevalent but extremely abstract concept of violence that conflates secondary aggression as a form of sexual violence and places it on the same level as the primary aggression (i.e. the original case of sexual violence).

However, as soon as the accusation of sexual violence was made, WS offered to refer the case to a neutral and fair third-party organization for investigation. It is not secondary aggression to ask whether the primary aggression in fact occurred: this point is soundly argued in Kyunghee University philosophy professor Choi Seong-ho’s brilliant book What is Proper Victimhood? Reflections of a Philosopher on Sexual Crime Trials (Philosophic, 2019).

But Jeon Ji-yun turned down the offer citing awkward reasons and carried on with his smear campaign. It was indeed a campaign, one that was organized, and unprecedentedly unrelenting. Moreover Jeon only sought to isolate us while avoiding any debate. That was the real purpose of his campaign.

We had no choice but to conduct the debate via a civil lawsuit. We felt a civil court was more suitable than a criminal court as an avenue for both sides to freely argue their case.

So how did the court rule? The court found Jeon’s claim that WS has committed ‘secondary aggression against a victim of sexual violence’ to be baseless and false. It ordered Jeon to pay KRW 5 million to WS in compensation for damages caused by spreading falsehoods, which Jeon subsequently paid in full.

For his part, Jeon filed a countersuit against WS, but the court dismissed all of his claims. After losing his first and second trials, Jeon had to give up appealing his case (which he was certain to lose again).

What reason would the judiciary have to side with WS, a revolutionary leftist organization, over Jeon, an editorial board member of a paper supporting the pro-reform wing of the Democratic party? Jeon’s partner, who claims to be the victim of sexual violence in the original case, is an office worker who also proudly posted a photo taken with then-president Moon Jae-in in her social media page. The court nevertheless sided with WS because Jeon’s case was built on heaps of lies.

Moreover, Jeon either denied or lied in court about his key claims underpinning his accusations against WS (all evidence available, and also read our statement: ‘Jeon must admit his own lies in court and stop slandering Workers’ Solidarity’).

The fact that the leader of the smear campaign has himself contradicted his key claims means that the entire foundation of the slander against WS has collapsed.

Therefore, it is Jeon who has to apologize to WS, not WS.

The decision by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and South Korean Coalition for Anti-discrimination Legislation (CADL) to ostracize WS, which UA mentions, also carries no authority at all. KCTU and CADL never investigated the facts themselves; they simply decided to stigmatize and ostracize WS based only on Jeon’s words (and in line with a one-sided application of the ‘victim-centered approach’, motivated by bureaucratic complacency). (see also WS’ statement on the decision by KCTU’s Central Executive Committee to ostracize WS).

Even after Jeon lied in court by saying that KCTU and CADL “conducted investigations into the facts,” the two are keeping their silence and avoiding responsibility.

Therefore, KCTU and CADL’s decisions do not represent Korea’s “progressive movement community” in any way. Even inside KCTU, the precise meaning and concrete application of ‘secondary aggression’ have been a constant source of strife.

The KCTU leadership is also subject to ongoing controversy over its violation of the general elections policy adopted by the KCTU convention of representatives. Given this, it is all the more laughable to lean on KCTU’s decision for legitimacy.

3. Women feel safe and play active roles in PSP

UA argues it decided to exclude WS, whom it labels a “secondary agressor in sexual violence,” to create a “safe space for women and LGBTQ+ people.”

Far from feeling unsafe, women and LGBTQ+ people have been actively involved in PSP activities. Muslim women in particular – one of the most marginalized groups in the world today – play leadership roles. On March 8 this year celebrating International Women’s Day, PSP held a protest in solidarity with Palestinian women where many Muslim women including Palestinians living in Korea took initiatives in organizing the event.

International Women’s Day was not the only such occasion. Women from diverse backgrounds and nationalities continue to play leading roles by chairing rallies, leading chants, doing volunteer work, organizing exhibitions, planning events, etc.

4. Some of the groups and individuals involved in UA’s decision ought to reflect critically on their own misconduct

Some individuals and leading members of organizations that spearheaded UA’s decision to exclude WS have a history of committing actual violence (not just the verbal kind) or of making discriminatory comments. Let us mention just a few examples, although plenty more exist.

Y, one of the founders and leading member of Workers’ Revolution Party (Preparatory Group), was president of the founding group of Rank and File Workers’ Paper in 2004. At a gathering of the group for drinks, K hit M on the head four times with a 500 cc glass. But Y defended K (“The truth behind the slander against Rank and File Workers’ Paper,” July 20, 2004). Y also has a record of conviction for assault in the late 1970s. If we were to apply UA’s logic, doesn’t the participation of WRP, founded and still led by someone like Y, go against building a “safe space for women and LGBTQ+ people”? In this case, the threat to a “safe space” may be rather real.

In another example, a leading member of March to Socialism (hereafter MS), made sexist comments in relation to WS’ activities to support the 2013 rail strike: “WS uses young female members, placing them at the forefront when intervening in workers’ struggles.”

According to Jeon’s own logic he may himself pose a threat to a “safe space.” In 2001 Jeon followed C, a woman who broke up with Jeon, demanding her to change her mind. C angrily recounted to her circle of WS members how Jeon followed her all the way across the Jamsil bridge. Doesn’t this fit the definition of stalking?

In addition, Jeon made a remark comparing Lee Hyo-ri to Kang Bu-ja in 2003 when the Roh Moo-hyun government’s justice minister Kang Geum-sil was being compared to Lee Hyo-ri; he was scolded by WS members for denigrating women for their looks.

WS does not take oppression of women and LGBTQ+ people lightly. We have stood against such oppression and supported their liberation since the early 1990s, when other left organizations in Korea had yet to be enlightened on these questions.

WS has a zero tolerance policy for sexual violence and established procedures to thoroughly handle cases of sexual misconduct, which have been applied in practice. Such gender-equal political culture explains why women make up about half of WS’ membership and are actively involved in its activities.

5. Why are there two separate Palestine solidarity coalitions?

The leading organizations of UA state that they “constantly receive inquiries about why there are two coalitions for Palestine solidarity.” They then offer WS’ “secondary aggression [against a victim of sexual violence]” as the reason – after a whole year of going their separate way.

First, we reiterate the fact that immediately following Hamas’ October 7 attack last year, WS invited BDS Korea (the main group organizing UA’s activities) to build solidarity action together.

But BDS Korea made no reply to WS’ offer. Almost two weeks later, BDS Korea held the first UA rally with other organizations.

At its inception UA made no decision referring to the allegation of ‘secondary aggression’ as reason for launching a separate coalition not involving WS. Neither were the UA-affiliated groups united in their view about the controversy.

Of course multiple coalitions can form around one and the same issue. When groups differ too much in their points of emphasis and prospects, it can be more effective to march separately toward the common enemy rather than being paralyzed by constant in-fighting.

In fact a number of major movements in Korea feature multiple coalitions. Two coalitions campaign for the ouster of the Yoon Seok-ryeol government; recent protests against deepfake crimes were separately organized by two entities; there are two climate movement coalitions (Climate Strike Korea and Climate Justice Alliance).

The same goes for the Palestine solidarity movement. The key initial difference that led UA to organize separately from PSP was over how to view Hamas’ October 7 attack.

In the immediate wake of the attack, the mass media bombarded Hamas with condemnation. Not only right-wing papers like Chosun Ilbo but also liberal papers such as Kyunghyang Shinmun joined in the attack.

Despite this, PSP’s main founding groups firmly and unconditionally defended Palestinians’ right to armed resistance.

By contrast, UA wavered and hesitated over Hamas, because it was unable to adopt an unambiguous common position on Hamas’ pre-emptive attack. People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and its affiliated groups condemned both Israel and Hamas in equal measure, while BDS Korea and other key organizing groups could not clearly challenge that line (despite their “objection to equivalent critique” of Israel and Hamas).

Due to such wavering and hesitation, UA held its first rally almost two weeks later than PSP at that crucial moment. By then Israel’s ruthless genocide of Palestinians was drawing outrage from people all over the world. UA came into action belatedly, but even then internally agreed not to take a stand on Hamas’ resistance.

UA’s indecision was not only due to their pacifist objection to Hamas’ attack on civilians; it also had to do with prejudice about Islam(ism).

A leader of BDS Korea classified Hamas as a right-wing force within the Palestinian movement by virtue of being an Islamist party, while classifying secular organizations like Fatah and the PLO as left-wing. But it should not be overlooked that Hamas rose to prominence in Palestine because the secular nationalist Fatah and PLO acted in the service of Israel and the US.

In similar vein, the above-mentioned March to Socialism (MS) also characterises Hamas as “a conservative part of the movement.”

Such difference between PSP and UA also influenced the ethos and composition of their participants. Foreigners who have attended both sides’ rallies attest to a clear difference in their tone and spirit. In PSP, Arabs including Palestinians and migrants from diverse countries play a leading role.

UA has worked hard to involve more civic groups. But their rallies do not seem to grow in proportion to the number of signed-up organizations. Indeed, Korean participants alone in PSP rallies outnumber those in UA rallies.

We hope that the organizations leading UA would engage in constructive debate over genuine political issues rather than rely on scheming and smearing as a way to avoid real debate.(read “Major debates within the Palestine solidarity movement” for an overview of such political issues)

6. Stop sowing division by invoking issues of little relevance

UA says all sorts of “liberations are interconnected.” That is of course analytically true. Even so, taking a vague, abstract rather than concrete approach to individual and specific issues tends to promote divisive practices in the course of building action (especially when working with other groups).

For example, MS, who was among the leading voices behind UA’s decision to exclude WS, had proposed a motion inside the September 7 Climate Justice March Organizing Committee to “exclude the Progressive Party and the Basic Income Party which co-founded a satellite party with the Democratic Party.” Participation in the Democratic satellite party was not directly relevant to climate action, but nonetheless invoked as cause to exclude the parties from a climate coalition. MS is thus behaving not as a movement-builder but as a thought-enforcer within the movement.

But MS’ thought-enforcement isn’t even consistently applied. PSPD produced 11 minister-level officials who served in the Democratic Moon Jae-in government (not counting two who resigned during parliamentary hearings) and is currently the dominant voice within UA, and yet MS never called for PSPD’s exclusion from the said climate coalition. The Progressive Party, by contrast, failed to secure a single official post in the Democratic government.

We must also note Platform C’s inconsistency at this point. Platform C opposed MS’ motion in the September 7 Climate Justice March Organizing Committee on the grounds that “one cannot stubbornly impose a particular political position; doing so would disintegrate the coalition.” Moreover, “excluding potential rivals from mass organizations and movements is no way to vindicate the correctness of our position and practice.” And yet Platform C voted in favor of UA’s decision to exclude WS.

Because they think sexual violence is a different matter? Did WS as a group sexually assault the victim? In the words of the judge at WS’ civil lawsuit rebuking Jeon, “why do you keep saying WS the group is the aggressor when in fact it was an individual?”

Those who fail to distinguish between the individual and the group seem to believe either that all organizations should assume joint liability for individual members’ behavior, or that any alleged misconduct must be (bureaucratically) punished, no questions asked.

UA paints their decision as being in the interest of “broader solidarity.” However, at a time that calls for further strengthening the movement against Israel and its western imperialist backers who have massacred tens of thousands of Palestinians and are now escalating the war into Lebanon, their fixation with smearing a group that has dedicated itself to that movement makes a mockery of the phrase “broader solidarity.”

WS will continue to throw itself into building the Palestine solidarity movement. We hope that in the meantime, UA organizers would stop doing disservice to Palestinians by acting out their petty feelings of rivalry and envy.

November 5, 2024
Workers’ Solidarity

이메일 구독, 앱과 알림 설치
‘아침에 읽는 〈노동자 연대〉’
매일 아침 7시 30분에 보내 드립니다.
앱과 알림을 설치하면 기사를
빠짐없이 받아 볼 수 있습니다.